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I N D E X
of
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
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Monday, 17 March 1947

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 0930.

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Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before, HONORABLE
LORD PATRICK, Member from the United Kingdom of Great
Britain, not sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

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(English to Japanese and Japanese
to English interpretation was made by the
Language Section, IMTFE.)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except OKAWA who is represented by his counsel. That
5 will be taken to be the case until I announce other-
6 wise on behalf of the Tribunal.

7 LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): Mr. President --

8 THE PRESIDENT: Major Moore.

9 LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): With the
10 Tribunal's permission we call attention to the fact
11 that in exhibit No. 2377 the words "school training"
12 and "training in schools" should be read "school
13 military training" and "military training in schools"
14 throughout the document. An approved errata sheet
15 or revised translation will be submitted as soon as
16 possible -- submitted to the Tribunal as soon as
17 possible.
18

19 MR. BANNO: BANNO, Counsel.

20 Last week we finished reading the affidavit
21 by the witness YOSHIDA and I have submitted that the
22 counsel had a few questions -- supplementary questions
23 to ask. May I be permitted to ask a few questions by
24 way of supplementation?

25 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, put them.

YOSHIDA

DIRECT

1 A K I O Y O S H I D A, called as a witness on
2 behalf of the defense resumed the stand and
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as
4 follows:

5 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

6 BY MR. BANNO:

7 Q Mr. Witness, what sort of effect had this
8 military training at schools upon the military tac-
9 tics of the students trained?

10 A Very little or no result whatsoever was
11 obtained from the standpoint of special military
12 technique. If any, the results were extremely small.

13 Q Could you cite any practical experiences from
14 your personal experiences in order to prove what you
15 have just stated to the Court?

16 A In 1932 when students trained in the schools
17 in military drill, et cetera, underwent a military
18 inspection in which I took part, the Unit Commander
19 who took charge of the inspection said that in spite
20 of the long training carried out in the schools, very
21 little result has been obtained and not only did I
22 hear of such results but I saw with my own eyes how
23 little effect such training had.

24 In 1936 at the Fukuchiyama Regiment I personally
25 conducted inspections. I personally supervised the

YOSHIDA

DIRECT

1 inspection of new conscripts. At that time similar
2 results were observed. The acquisition of what
3 military technique these students had was so irregular
4 and as a matter of fact -- so irregular and because --
5 and in spite of -- as a result of a long training in
6 the schools they had developed certain habits which
7 were very difficult to break in order to teach them
8 a uniform military -- to give them uniform military
9 training. This inspection I carried out as a
10 battalion commander.

11 Q Mr. Witness, can you explain the reason why
12 the results of the training were so poor?

13 A To put my answer simply, one reason is the
14 lack of teaching personnel; second, the very little
15 time given to military drills, lack of time for
16 military drills; other reasons are lack of materials
17 and equipment for military training and lack of space.
18 I might say inspection ground or training grounds
19 would be another reason.

20 MR. BANC: I conclude the direct examination.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Prosecution may cross-examine.

23 MR. TAVENNER: I would like to inquire if there
24 is any further examination by defense counsel.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan says there is not.

YOSHIDA

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1 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, I would
2 like to point out that there appears in this affi-
3 davit numerous quotations from speeches. For instance,
4 at page five there are one and a half pages of a
5 quotation from a speech by Colonel INAMURA. We
6 think that that is not the proper way to prove,
7 under the rules of the Tribunal, a speech or any
8 other document.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Do you question whether it
10 was made?

11 MR. TAVENNER: I don't know, sir.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Why waste time on proving
13 it otherwise if you do not question the accuracy of it?
14 If you do, we may require the defense to prove it
15 in a different manner, but why do that and waste
16 time if there is no doubt that the speech was made?

17 MR. TAVENNER: I am not objecting to the
18 contents of this particular speech. I merely want to
19 point out to the Court that it seems that this is
20 becoming a practice in the method of introducing
21 documents and speeches; and before many other documents
22 are processed I thought it might be well to call the
23 matter to the Tribunal's attention so that if it is
24 deemed proper, the practice be stopped if it is
25 considered in violation of the rules of the Tribunal,

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1 which I think it should be.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: This witness may have
2 heard the colonel make that speech or he may have
3 had to know of it in the course of his business.
4 If so, this is the way to prove it. However, you
5 apparently know what documents the defense are
6 processing or about to process. You could indicate
7 to them the speeches that you want proved more
8 strictly, but you would do that only where you
9 questioned the accuracy of what was being processed.
10 Give notice to the defense in those cases, and if
11 they persist in proving the speeches, as they now
12 propose, we will deal with the situation; but I
13 don't suppose it will ever arise.

14 I hope the prosecution isn't going to
15 become over technical. Have you any fault to find
16 with the suggestion I have made, Mr. Tavenner? I
17 shall hear any objections you have to it.

18 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir, I have. I suggest
19 that, rather than take the time of the entire
20 Tribunal, we refer the matter to chambers for
21 fuller discussion. I think there is more that can
22 be said on the subject from our standpoint.

23 THE PRESIDENT: If you bring the matter up
24 in chambers, I will always be prepared to hear you.
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YOSHIDA

CROSS

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. TAVENNER:

Q Mr. YOSHIDA, over what period of time were you a member of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry?

A From 1937 to 1941.

Q What time in 1941?

A March 1941.

Q During this period of time how were matters relating to military training in the schools coordinated between the War Ministry and the Education Ministry?

A Generally the same as in the past.

Q How was that?

A What I mean by "as in the past" is that the War Ministry contacted the Education Ministry in accordance with the items presented by superior officers, and there is nothing particularly -- particular or special to mention, only that military training in the higher schools and in the junior colleges was increased to thirty minutes per week. That is -- was our suggestion.

THE MONITOR: Increased by thirty minutes.

Q When you stated that superior officers in the War Ministry took matters up with the Education

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 Ministry, what superior officers are you referring
2 to?

3 A What I mean by superior officers is
4 those -- are those who ranked above me while I was
5 in charge of school military training, namely,
6 the section chief, the bureau chief, the Vice-
7 Minister, and the Minister.

8 THE MONITOR: The section chief of the Mili-
9 tary Service Section and bureau chief of the Mili-
10 tary Service Bureau, the Vice-Minister, and the
11 Minister.

12 Q You refer in your affidavit to the Cadet
13 System of training. What is the date of the origin
14 of that system?

15 A I cannot reply because that is outside the
16 province of my work. This question of the Cadet
17 System belongs to the Military Service, that is,
18 to the actual Military Service Branch of the matter.

19 Q Is the Cadet System a different system from
20 the so-called Young Men's Training Institute, or is
21 it the same thing?

22 A That is a special qualification given to a
23 graduate of a youth-- of a young men's training
24 school in becoming an officer cadet; but that privi-
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YOSHIDA

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1 lege also open to other graduates, graduates of other
2 schools as well.

3 Q The Young Men's Training Institute, then,
4 is a separate matter from the Cadet System?

5 A Entirely separate.

6 Q This Young Men's Training Institute
7 contemplated a four-years' course, did it not?

8 A Yes.

9 Q The course of training included 400 hours
10 of military training, with 200 hours of Morals and
11 Civics, 200 hours of ordinary courses, and 100 hours
12 of Vocational training, is that correct?

13 A I recall that is generally so, but as to
14 more particular and accurate details, I would
15 suggest that you would inquire of some other witness.

16 Q Now, these young mens' training schools
17 were combined with other types of schools and were
18 given the name of Youth Schools, were they not?

19 A The Youth School was not combined with any
20 other school. It was a special school, open to
21 young men of the laboring classes of the people
22 who were unable to go to other schools.

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1 Q At any rate this type of school was changed,
2 that is, the name was changed to Youth School, is that
3 correct?

4 A Yes, the Young Men's Training Institute was
5 changed to Youth's School.

6 Q Was that in 1935?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Then your affidavit on page 9 where you state
9 that in 1939 the name was changed is wrong, isn't it?

10 A It means that in 1939 the school military
11 training of the Youth Training School became compulsory
12 but there is no mistake in the fact that the Youth
13 Training School was renamed the Youth School in 1935.
14 I might add that this misunderstanding may have been
15 caused by the fact that my writing was not clear enough.

16 Q Isn't it a fact that all young workers at
17 youth schools were compelled to attend -- strike the
18 question, please. Isn't it true that all young workers
19 were compelled to attend youth schools in 1937?

20 A Yes.

21 Q So that as far as workers were concerned
22 attendance was compulsory in 1937?

23 A At that time, that is, in 1937, the com-
24 pulsory system had not yet been established and in
25 accordance with the demands of the time it was desired

YOSHIDA

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1 that as many young men of the working class would attend
2 these schools, but because it wasn't a compulsory
3 system not all of them attended and if they did not
4 attend there was nothing that could be done about it.

5 Q But you stated they were compelled to attend
6 this school in 1937.

7 A My meaning is that the youths' attendance at
8 these schools were required in principle but not
9 being compulsory there were quite a large number of
10 youths who, because of home duties or because of their
11 various occupations, could not attend and did not
12 attend.

13 Q What means were used to secure attendance by
14 workers at those schools?

15 A Night courses were opened in order to permit
16 working youths to attend school outside of their
17 working hours.

18 Q Now, what month in the year 1937 was it that
19 all youth were required to attend these schools, that
20 is, all working youth?

21 A As I have said repeatedly before, the system
22 became compulsory from 1939.

23 Q But you have also told us that they were
24 required in 1937 to attend school but it wasn't
25 strictly enforced. I want you to tell us at what time

YOSHIDA

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1 in 1937 it was that they were required first to attend
2 these schools.

3 A On that point I have no recollection.

4 Q You state in your affidavit that at one time
5 military training was a part of gymnastic courses.
6 When did military training become independent of
7 such courses?

8 A 1939.

9 Q Was a regulation issued on this subject and
10 if so please give its description and date.

11 A No special regulations were issued. Before
12 that time gymnastics and military training were courses
13 given under the general subject of gymnastic courses
14 and when the military training course was separately
15 set up a notice was sent out by the Education Ministry
16 to that effect. That is all.

17 Q What was the date of that notice?

18 A I don't know the details.

19 Q Do you know in what month the notice was
20 issued?

21 A I don't recall. Do you mean the exact date?

22 Q The exact month in which notice was given.

23 A I don't have any positive recollection, so
24 I shall not hazard a guess.

25 Q Will you give me such description of that

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 notice that will enable us to call for its production?

2 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, I would
3 like to object to that question by the prosecutor on
4 the grounds the witness has already said he knew
5 nothing about it and now the prosecutor is asking
6 him to produce something he knows nothing about.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The objection should be taken
8 by the Japanese counsel who examined in chief. Where
9 is he?

10 MR. BANNO: I object to the prosecutor's
11 question because he is inquiring something of the
12 witness that he has already denied that he doesn't
13 know anything about.

14 MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal,
15 the witness has said a specific notice was given by
16 the Education Ministry. I am trying now to find the
17 date of that notice and how to obtain the original.
18 The witness has merely said he did not remember the
19 date.

20 THE PRESIDENT: You may even press him to
21 remember if he can. The objection is overruled.

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1 Q Will you answer the question, please.

2 A In case any such revisions in courses are made,
3 the ministry in charge, and, in this case, the Ministry
4 of Education would in principle send out notices to the
5 effect that a change has been made, and, therefore,
6 I believe that when the military training course was
7 established as an independent course some such notifica-
8 tion was sent out by that ministry.

9 THE PRESIDENT: That is sufficient. He assumes
10 the practice. He doesn't know the particular document
11 going out.

12 Q Before the action was taken by the Education
13 Ministry did the War Ministry consult the Education
14 Ministry on this subject?

15 A Yes, a proposal was submitted and after many
16 days of study the proposal was adopted and instituted.

17 Q Now, when did your department present that
18 proposal to the Education Ministry?

19 A Talk of such a matter began, I think, somewhere
20 around the summer of 1936, and, if my memory serves
21 me right, I think such a proposal was made in May, 1937.

22 Q Then, the matter was discussed between the War
23 Ministry and the Education Ministry from May 1937 until
24 the notice was finally sent out in 1939; is that correct?

25 THE INTERPRETER: The witness replied "yes."

YOSHIDA

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1 MR. BANNO: I object, your Honor. I do not
2 think it proper to put such a question to this witness
3 because this witness was not in the War Ministry until
4 1937, and, therefore, is not familiar with matters
5 preceding that time.

6 THE MONITOR: This witness was not placed
7 in charge of such matters until August 1937.

8 MR. BANNO (Continuing): Furthermore, this
9 witness did not directly participate in youth training
10 but he is just familiar with it only in connection with
11 the school military training with which he had been
12 connected. With respect to youth training we expect to
13 have another witness to testify. That fact is well
14 indicated in this witness' affidavit.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Well, he has given an affirmative
16 answer. The objection is overruled.

17 Q Mr. YOSHIDA, on page 17 of your affidavit
18 you state the military authorities merely cooperated
19 and assisted from the sidelines. As a matter of fact,
20 the influence of -- I have not finished the question --
21 As a matter of fact, Mr. YOSHIDA, the influence of
22 military personnel in the schools steadily grew until
23 the schools were completely under the control of the
24 military; is that not true?

25 MR. BANNO: I object, your Honor. This is

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1 outside of the scope of the examination in chief.

2 THE PRESIDENT: It is well within the scope
3 of the examination in chief and the prosecutor is
4 allowed to put to this witness the evidence already
5 given for the prosecution to see how he reacts to it.
6 The objection is overruled.

7 Q Dr. TAKIKAWA, the Dean of Law at Kyoto University,
8 testified on this subject as follows: I would like to
9 read the one short paragraph near the middle of page one
10 of exhibit No. 131.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Did the witness answer the
12 question before it was objected to? I am referring
13 to the last question objected to.

14 THE INTERPRETER: This the Language Section, sir.
15 In our recollection the witness replied "yes" before
16 the objection was made.

17 THE PRESIDENT: I thought so.

18 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, on this
19 last question I would like to object to offering -- asking
20 the witness to offer an opinion about some book that he
21 might have read.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. McManus, I told you that
23 the objections must come from the Japanese counsel who
24 examined in chief.

25 MR. McMANUS: I am sorry.

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 THE PRESIDENT: Do observe that. It is your
2 own arrangement with the Court.

3 MR. TAVENNER: I will read the indicated para-
4 graph near the middle of page one of the affidavit and
5 then will ask the witness whether or not it is a true
6 statement of the general situation.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Tavenner, what is the
8 prosecution document number, sir?

9 MR. TAVENNER: The prosecution number is 11503,
10 exhibit No. 131, the statement of Dr. TAKIKAWA. (Reading)

11 "Gradually the influence of these officers became
12 more dominant in the schools and they increasingly had
13 more to say about the manner in which the university should
14 be operated. When they first came to the college they
15 did not have a great deal of influence but gradually
16 following the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the China
17 Incident in 1937 they gained more and more influence,
18 with the result that the university eventually was
19 completely under the control of the military."

20 Q Now, Mr. YOSHIDA, is that a true statement of the
21 general situation in Japan at that time?
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1 A That statement I believe is a very great
2 mistake. Officers who were assigned to school military
3 training in the various schools were under the direct
4 supervision and control of the principal or head of
5 the school, and never interfered in the administration
6 of the school. The central authorities, that is the
7 military authorities, had -- very emphatically
8 instructed the officers assigned to these schools not
9 to interfere in anything except the job to which they
10 were assigned, that is, military training. I pre-
11 sume, however, that officers when asked for their
12 opinion would or may have given their personal opinion,
13 but only as individuals.

14 Inasmuch as school administration is usually
15 considered by the faculty council and that would be
16 the customary way, no one in his -- with any common
17 sense could imagine that one officer, a military
18 officer assigned to this particular school, could
19 influence the administration of a school.

20 Q As I understand, you are basing your answer
21 upon instructions that were given to the military
22 representatives in these schools, and not upon actual
23 practice.

24 A Inasmuch as the -- an officer assigned to
25 the Kyoto Imperial University would have to, in order

1 to gain more hours for his particular course, would
2 have to get the consent of the faculty council and
3 the authorized permission of the president of the
4 university, and that -- inasmuch as this is a fact,
5 I do not think that the officer attached to that
6 particular university could influence one way or the
7 other by himself, and that being the case I do not
8 think that officers attached to other schools or any
9 other school could do the same.

10 Q Your answer was not in response to my ques-
11 tion. I will proceed to another question.

12 Did you not, on page 16 of your affidavit,
13 state that the War Ministry gave detailed instruction
14 to the schools under the guidance of the army, con-
15 cerning the enforcement of training from its own
16 special standpoint?

17 A I should like to have the particular page
18 indicated to me in Japanese, because I do not think
19 that I expressed it -- my thoughts, in just such a
20 manner.

21 MR. BANNO: Page 16 of the Japanese text,
22 paragraph 5.

23 A Yes, I have stated so, but this meant not
24 to the schools but to the officers -- detailed
25 instructions to the officers assigned to these schools

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 for purposes of military training.

2 Q Then do you desire to change your statement
3 from what it was in the affidavit? Because in the
4 affidavit you stated that the War Ministry gave
5 detailed instructions to the schools.

6 A I presume that would be a mistake in trans-
7 lation, because I do not say such a thing in Japanese.
8 There should be no misunderstanding if you would read
9 my text, paragraph 5, page 16.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Well, my understanding is
11 you read your text and you admitted what the prose-
12 cutor put to you. Let us be clear about it. Read
13 your text again.

14 A Then I shall read paragraph 5. There is no
15 reference to schools. It is the guidance and train-
16 ing and education of the officers assigned to schools
17 in order to enhance their technical ability.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, this is the
19 Language Section. Apparently there is a mistake in
20 translation in the English text. That is where the
21 difficulty arises.

22 MR. TAVENNER: I will ask that the matter
23 be referred to the Monitor.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I understood the translator
25 to say it had been referred to the Language Section,

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 but if it has not been it will be.

2 Q Mr. YOSHIDA, contrary to your statement
3 that military authorities merely cooperated and
4 assisted from the side lines, did not regular army
5 officers, by their lectures and training, endeavor to
6 inspire a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic spirit
7 in the students?

8 MR. BANNO: I object, your Honor; the ques-
9 tion is asking for the witness' opinion.

10 THE PRESIDENT: He is still entitled to
11 put his own evidence. He can test credit in this
12 way.

13 The objection is overruled.

14 THE WITNESS: May I say a word, sir?

15 THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question.

16 MR. TAVENNER: I asked you a question.

17 A In the present question by the prosecutor
18 there seems to have been no distinction made between
19 the youth schools and school military training. The
20 youth school was under the jurisdiction and in the
21 charge of the Ministry of Education and the pre-
22 fectural governors. In respect of these schools the
23 War Ministry was on the side lines and cooperated from
24 that position.

25 Q But I asked you whether they didn't do more

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 than merely cooperate from the side lines.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner, surely you do
3 not expect an affirmative answer to the question you
4 have put. That is only a practical consideration,
5 however.

6 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

7 ("hereupon, at 1045, a recess
8 was taken until 1100, after which the
9 proceedings were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

4 BY MR. TAVENNER (Continued):

5 Q Mr. YOSHIDA, with regard to the character
6 of the lectures and training offered by the regular
7 army military officers in the high schools and
8 colleges, I desire to read to you several paragraphs
9 from the affidavit of OUCHI, Hyoe, a witness for the
10 prosecution, which appears as exhibit 130. It is
11 prosecution No. 11,507. And I believe the translation
12 pool should be able to give us simultaneous translation.

13 The affiant was a professor at Imperial Univer-
14 sity at Tokyo, teaching economics and public finance.

15 I will begin reading:

16 "The military training and lectures were con-
17 ducted in schools of all grades by regular army
18 officers, the officers conducting the courses making
19 every effort by lectures, training and propaganda
20 to inspire a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic
21 spirit in the students. It was taught by the military
22 instructors that the Japanese were a superior race,
23 that war was productive, and it was Japan's destiny to
24 rulle the Far East, and thereafter the whole world, and
25 that the progress of the nation required the students

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 to be prepared for aggressive wars in the future to
2 accomplish these ends.

3 "The foundation of the effort to inspire a
4 militaristic and ultra-nationalistic spirit in the
5 students was based upon a rescript of Emperor MEIJI
6 on education, published in 1890, which rescript pro-
7 vided that the most important duty of a subject was
8 to the country and the Emperor, together with a
9 rescript issued by the Emperor to military and naval
10 officers, soldiers and sailors on their duties. These
11 rescripts, together with textbooks, lectures, military
12 training and teachings, were used by the military
13 instructors to teach and inculcate in the students a
14 belief in the great glory of Japan, and the duty of
15 the Japanese to aid and further the Holy Mission of
16 Japan to gain control of and rule the Far East, and
17 thereafter the world, and that in the accomplishing
18 of this Holy Mission the greatest glory of all for a
19 Japanese was the privilege of dying in the service
20 of the Emperor."

21 THE PRESIDENT: Will you stop there and ask
22 him his answer on that? I understand you want to put
23 another paragraph to him first. It is a lot to reply
24 to.

25 MR. TAVENNER: Yes.

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 THE PRESIDENT: It is a lot to remember, as
2 well.

3 Q Mr. Witness, do you recall the type of
4 lectures that I read were being delivered and the
5 effect that it was claimed they were having upon the
6 students of Japan; and if so, do you agree that that
7 statement is true?

8 A I am not familiar with the facts regarding
9 the OUCHI statement, but I do like to make a few
10 remarks. At that time, if I might be permitted to
11 describe the situation existing in Japan, there was a
12 great deal of thought or ideological confusion. The
13 thought or tendency -- the ideological tendency existed
14 which sought to destroy the Japanese fundamental
15 character of the Japanese state, that is, the national
16 polity of Japan. And, therefore, as against such a
17 tendency and situation it was necessary to consider
18 some safeguards, some protection.

19 Inasmuch as the tendency was to bring about
20 the destruction of the state through ideological means,
21 it was believed in the field of education that in
22 order to safeguard and maintain the independence of
23 the Japanese nation, a just concept of state should
24 be fostered among the student generation of this
25 country. And if the people did not have this just

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 concept of nation or concept of state, then there would
2 be no way of preventing the collapse of the country.

3 And so I think that lectures were being given
4 in order to implant a stronger and more healthy
5 concept of state, but I do not think that it went
6 anywhere near ultra-nationalism or anything that would
7 cause any harm to the mental and spiritual condition
8 of the students of this nation.

9 Inasmuch as the officers attached to these
10 schools were under the direct supervision and control
11 of the heads of schools, the Education Ministry, and
12 inasmuch as they were emphatically instructed by the
13 central military authorities not to overstep the
14 bounds, and inasmuch as they were instructed not to
15 interfere in other than military subjects, although
16 such lectures were carried on I do not believe that
17 they were anything that would be destructive of this
18 nation.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Were those instructions in
20 writing?

21 THE INTERPRETER: It appears that the witness
22 has misunderstood the question. His present reply
23 was that some of these lectures were probably written,
24 but he was not familiar with those going back to
25 around 1931.

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 A I do not have any recollection, your Honor,
2 but I think that these instructions were in writing,
3 or some of them were -- at least some of them were in
4 writing.
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1 Q When were they given?

2 A I think they were issued around 1931.

3 Q They were given by whom?

4 A At that time I was attached to the headquarters
5 of the Kyoto Division, and I think such instructions
6 were issued by the divisional commander.

7 Q That was about the time of the so-called
8 Mukden Incident, wasn't it?

9 A Yes, about that time I should think.

10 THE PRESIDENT: You can go on to the next
11 paragraph now.

12 Q Now, I will read you another paragraph.

13 "That beginning in 1931 domination by the
14 military of the universities and schools increasingly
15 became more apparent, such domination having reached
16 such proportions in 1937 following the China Incident
17 that professors and teachers were required to cooperate
18 fully and wholeheartedly in the program of inculcating
19 in the students a fanatical militaristic and ultr-
20 nationalistic spirit. Failure to cooperate fully in
21 this program would bring punishment by dismissal from
22 the school or imprisonment, all expressions of thought
23 in favor of the ideals of peace or in opposition to
24 the policy of preparation for aggressive warfare being
25 rigidly suppressed in the schools, this suppression

YOSHIDA

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1 being directed to students as well as teachers and
2 professors."

3 Now, Mr. YOSHIDA, does that state the facts?

4 Mr. BANNO: I object, your honor, that this
5 question is outside the scope of the examination in
6 chief. The quotation just read refers to education
7 in general. This witness is here to testify in con-
8 nection with military training in the schools.

9 THE PRESIDENT: I think we said we would
10 disregard all these opinions. I don't know that our
11 decision goes back to this particular affidavit; the
12 point may not have been taken in those days. But the
13 fact remains we are going to disregard opinions where
14 opinions are matters for us to entertain, and not
15 matters for the witness to form.

16 But a nice question arises as to whether you
17 can test credit by putting questions of this type on
18 this sort of evidence. Putting questions of this
19 type to such a witness, of course, is not a practical
20 consideration. It merely reminds us of what the prose-
21 cution's evidence was. We know what reply you can expect.
22 He isn't going to admit those things.

23 I can only regard that expression that you
24 have read to the witness as one of opinion.

25 Mr. TAVENNER: I would like to confine my

YOSHILA

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1 question to a matter of fact that appears in that
2 statement rather than to the larger question that I
3 presented before.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Well, pick out your statement
5 of fact, Mr. Tavenner.

6 Q I would like to ask this question: Whether
7 or not the teachers who failed to cooperate fully in
8 the program were punished by dismissal from the school
9 or imprisonment in 1937 and the years following?

10 A That is purely a school administrative
11 affair with which the army has no connection what-
12 soever, and in so far as military authorities are con-
13 cerned they have no authority to do such a thing.

14 Q Can you tell us when it was that the last
15 major revision of textbooks was made?

16 MR. BANNO: I object, your Honor. This is
17 a very abstract statement which does not arise from
18 the examination in chief.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Did I understand the question?
20 Wasn't it when the last revision of textbooks was made?
21 What was the question? I may have missed it.

22 MR. TAVENNER: That is right, sir.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is abstract about
24 it?

25 Objection overruled. Answer.

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 A There was not any general revision of text-
2 books. And in connection with textbooks I am referring
3 to textbooks on military subjects. Revisions were made
4 in the infantry manual from time to time as such
5 changes in subject matter were required.

6 Q We are discussing here the training in the
7 high schools and the universities. Of course, I am
8 not referring to military colleges.

9 A No, I am referring to textbooks used in the
10 high schools, junior colleges and universities, and
11 revisions in the various infantry manuals and other
12 manuals are made in accordance with any revisions
13 made in the military manual.

14 Q Well, were these textbooks revised in 1945
15 after the war as the result of the action of the
16 Minister of Education?

17 A I cannot reply because I am totally unfamiliar
18 with any matters relating to any time after August
19 1941.
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1 Q Let me read you what the witness MAEDA,
2 Tamon, Minister of Education from August 18, 1945,
3 to January 13, 1946, stated with regard to the text-
4 books then in use.

5 A You just said 1945. Is that all right?

6 Q That is right.

7 A Then I wish you would understand that since
8 I have had no connection with such matters at that
9 time I would only be able to reply as I have already
10 replied previously, that I will not be able to reply.

11 Q You have not yet heard the statement or the
12 question. I will read from exhibit 140, prosecution
13 document 11,500, on page 2, beginning at the middle
14 of the third paragraph from the bottom of the page,
15 beginning with the words, "I ordered":

16 "I ordered all of such textbooks destroyed
17 for the reason they were used to teach the students,
18 first, that Japan was a country superior to all other
19 countries, that was the most objectionable; another
20 was the confusion of facts with mystery and legend;
21 too much admiration of military action and warfare;
22 too much admiration and homage to military officers
23 and the idea of absolute subjection of the individual
24 in favor of the state."

25 Did you know that that action had been taken?

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 A As I have said before, I do not know. In
2 1945 I had no connection whatsoever with school
3 military training.

4 Q Do you know when the textbooks were put into
5 use that were destroyed by the Education Minister?

6 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please--

7 A Yes, since school military training was
8 instituted such books were in use as reference books.

9 MR. McMANUS: Before the answer is received
10 I would like to object to this entire line of question-
11 ing, if the Court pleases.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We prefer to hear Japanese
13 counsel. I have already said what the position is,
14 as we understand it. If there is any contest about
15 the propriety of confining the objections to Japanese
16 counsel I should like to have it threshed out. If we
17 are going to hear objections from fifty-odd counsel
18 I do not know when we would finish.

19 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, it might
20 be advisable to discuss that matter in Chambers also
21 with that other matter Mr. Tavenner suggested today at
22 about one o'clock.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Let Japanese counsel put the
24 objections. This particular counsel is quite capable
25 of putting them and no time is saved by letting American

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CROSS

1 counsel argue them.

2 Yes.

3 BY MR. TAVENNER (Continued):

4 Q I did not understand the date when the
5 witness said these textbooks were first used.

6 A Such textbooks were in use ever since the
7 institution of school military training in 1925.

8 Q You were a member of the War Ministry in
9 May 1937 and in March 1941, were you not?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Then I desire to read to you this additional
12 paragraph from the testimony of Education Minister
13 MAEDA: "In addition to the textbooks which I ordered
14 destroyed"--

15 THE MONITOR: Just a moment, please.

16 MR. TAVENNER: Yes. It is the second
17 paragraph from the bottom, a short paragraph. Are
18 you ready?

19 THE MONITOR: Please.

20 MR. TAVENNER (Reading): "In addition to the
21 textbooks which I ordered destroyed for the reasons
22 stated, there was also issued by the Ministry of Educa-
23 tion to be widely read by teachers, students and citi-
24 zens at large a book entitled 'Fundamental Principles
25 of the National Polity,' published in May 1937, and

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 'The Way of National Subjects,' which was published
2 in March 1941."

3 Q Are you familiar with the circumstances
4 surrounding the use of those books?

5 MR. McMANUS: Pending the Court's decision
6 in Chambers may I ask the permission of the Court to
7 say one word concerning this testimony, if your Honor
8 will bear with me for a moment?

9 THE PRESIDENT: I have not consulted my
10 colleagues but I have a feeling they are all against
11 you.

12 MR. McMANUS: May I ask your Honor to
13 discuss it? It is quite important right now, rather
14 than waiting until chamber time.

15 THE PRESIDENT: In my judgment it is not
16 important to decide this matter now. You are the
17 only counsel who thinks so. I am prepared to give
18 up my lunch hour to discuss this but I am not prepared
19 to waste twenty minutes of this Court's time. Every
20 point that you are about to make, if you are allowed
21 to make it, can be put by Japanese counsel; no in-
22 justice is being done.

23 MR. McMANUS: I take it then, your Honor,
24 that I may not make an objection at this time?

25 THE PRESIDENT: It is obvious that you want

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 to get things into the record with the view to making
2 it appear that the Court has done an injustice. I
3 tell you the Japanese counsel who examined in chief
4 is a most capable man and he is well capable of
5 putting any objection and making any representation
6 that you desire to make.

7 Yes.

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1 BY MR. TAVENNER (Continued):

2 Q Please answer the question.

3 A I cannot reply with respect to the
4 basis or fundamentals of education.

5 Q Did the War Department recommend the publi-
6 cation of those two books and their circulation
7 among the teachers and pupils?

8 A The two books, "The Fundamental Principle
9 of the Japanese State," and the other book, "The Way
10 of Loyal Subjects," was not printed and published by
11 the army but by the Education Ministry.

12 Q I ask you if they were published and
13 circulated at the suggestion of the War Department?

14 A I cannot -- I do not know of such a fact.

15 THE PRESIDENT: If you are about to object
16 in view of the answer, there is no need for it.

17 Q Was there a discussion between the War
18 Ministry and the Education Ministry regarding the
19 publication or the circulation of those two books or
20 either of them?

21 MR. BANNO: I object, your Honor. This is
22 outside of the scope of the direct examination and
23 outside of the experience of this witness.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I am inclined to agree with
25 this, Mr. Tavenner, but what have you to say?

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 The objection is upheld.

2 MR. TAVENNER: Has the Tribunal ruled? Has
3 your Honor ruled?

4 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is upheld.

5 Q Are you familiar with the cabinet decision
6 of July 26, 1940, relating to the so-called renova-
7 tion of the internal structure?

8 THE PRESIDENT: I really feel that question
9 is not put either to test credit or to get informa-
10 tion, but merely to remind us of the prosecution's
11 evidence, and if so it is objectionable. I suggest
12 it is argumentative and really anticipates the
13 prosecution summation, but I will take my colleagues'
14 views, if you press the question.

15 MR. TAVENNER: Your Honor, I wish to make
16 my point clear. I have one very definite question
17 in regard to that document I would like to ask this
18 witness which is not at all for the purpose of re-
19 viewing the testimony but to obtain a statement of
20 fact from him.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, put it. We will have
22 to hear it before we can decide upon it.

23 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor pleases, since
24 we are going to have a Chambers' hearing concerning
25 whether or not objections can be made by American

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 counsel or Japanese counsel -- we must decide some
2 policy -- can't we also put this particularly im-
3 portant question over until that time?

4 THE PRESIDENT: Do you realize you are
5 objecting to a question that you have not heard?
6 Until I hear the question I can give you no answer,
7 and nobody else can.

8 MR. McMANUS: Well, if the Court pleases,
9 that goes on record.

10 MR. TAVENNER: The witness has not answered
11 the question as to whether or not he is familiar
12 with the decision, cabinet decision of 26 July 1940.

13 THE PRESIDENT: You said you had another
14 question to ask; I do not know what it is. Is that
15 correct?

16 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Proceed to ask it.

18 Q In this cabinet decision reference is made
19 to the fact that the educational system had been
20 renovated in full accord with the fundamental
21 principle of national polity.

22 THE PRESIDENT: The observation I made as
23 to the propriety of your cross-examination applies
24 strongly to this question, but if you press it I will
25 ask my colleagues for their views.

YOSHIDA

CROSS

1 MR. TAVENNER: My question would be based
2 upon that statement, and if that is contrary to your
3 Honor's ruling I will withdraw the question. I can't
4 ask the question without reference to that fact.

5 THE PRESIDENT: I make no rulings; the
6 Tribunal does. But I do make suggestions occasionally,
7 and I have made it.

8 MR. TAVENNER: Well, sir, I will follow
9 your suggestion.

10 Q I would now like to refer to page 12 of
11 your affidavit and call your attention to your state-
12 ment that the training in the schools was aimed at dis-
13 ciplining students physically and mentally instead of
14 aiming at acquisition of military technique. Now
15 do you mean to state that the system put into effect
16 in 1936 and followed from then on in which machine
17 guns, infantry guns, field guns, mountain guns,
18 tanks, and aviation were used in the training of
19 high school and university students was not designed
20 to attain military technique?

21 A Yes.

22 MR. TAVENNER: I have no further questions.

23 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-
24 past one.

25 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)

YOSHIDA

REDIRECT

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,
at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

MR. BANNO: I have a few questions to ask
by way of redirect.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BANNO:

Q Now, Witness, I am going to ask you a
question concerning the question and answer -- the
final question and answer before the noon recess.

You stated that special training, or
glider training, was carried out in accordance with
the Imperial decree. What was the reason for them?

A The glider was used as a teaching material
in pursuance of the purpose of school military train-
ing, which is -- and is in line with -- which was
in line with the purpose of school training, which
is the upbuilding of character. Special emphasis
or stress was placed upon the use of the glider as
a part of school military training, because it takes
several men to handle and to put to flight a glider,
and the purpose of the use of this particular train-

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1 ing or teaching material was to promote coopera-
2 tive action and cooperative thinking, in order to
3 develop individual responsibility, and unless one
4 member of the crew cooperated -- in case one mem-
5 ber of the crew failed to cooperate, the glider
6 would not fly.

7 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, that
8 was all matter in chief. It certainly is not proper
9 redirect examination.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you did ask a ques-
11 tion of the witness relating to the use of machine
12 guns and small arms. I think this might well be
13 regarded as re-cross-examination of that.

14 The objection is overruled.

15 A (Continued) At that time the Japanese people
16 as a whole were lacking in scientific knowledge,
17 and this means was taken as one method by which to
18 cultivate the scientific spirit. Furthermore, speak-
19 ing from the standpoint of students, they would soon
20 tire out from long practices merely with the use of
21 a rifle, and therefore in order to renew their
22 interest and spirit, other teaching material and
23 training materials were introduced to keep up their
24 interest or to renew their interest and also at the
25 same time in response to the desires of the students

YOSHIDA

REDIRECT

1 themselves; and it was in response to and incorporat-
2 ing the hopes and desires of the students and the
3 various schools that the Ministry of Education
4 proposed the use of these materials in military
5 training.

6 Q Now, Mr. Witness, in response to the
7 prosecutor's cross-examination -- cross-question
8 you said -- you testified about the revision about
9 a certain textbook -- of textbooks. Did you mean
10 in particular the revision of textbooks for military
11 training?

12 A Yes. I should like to make it definitely
13 clear -- positively clear that I was referring
14 only to textbooks used for school military training
15 purposes.

16 Q Then, the revision of handbooks for mili-
17 tary training and other teaching materials for mili-
18 tary training -- correction -- then, it means simply
19 that handbooks of military training and other
20 materials for the military training were revised,
21 but other textbooks in general were not revised at
22 all?

23 THE MONITOR: Correction: You mean to say,
24 then, Mr. Witness, that while manuals or handbooks
25 for military training purposes were revised, other

YOSHIDA

REDIRECT

1 textbooks were not revised accordingly?

2 A As you say, I am referring only to mili-
3 tary manuals.

4 Q Now, were there any cases where students
5 could not graduate from schools because of the
6 fact that they failed to pass the examination in
7 military training at school?

8 A There are no instances of any students
9 failing to graduate merely because of failure in
10 their school military training course.

11 MR. BANNO: I conclude my redirect examina-
12 tion.

13 MR. TAVENNER: There are no questions by
14 the prosecution.

15 MR. BANNO: May the witness be excused?

16 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is excused on
17 the usual terms.

18 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

19 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, in
20 excusing these witnesses on the usual terms, we
21 would like to have it understood that they may be
22 recalled later, so that we won't have to make that
23 application after each witness is excused.

24 THE PRESIDENT: That is so.

25 It is understood that the Court can either

1 give the right or exercise itself the right to re-
2 call a witness.
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NAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 MR. McMANUS: At this time I would like to
2 present to the Court Mr. OKUYAMA who will call the
3 witness NAKAMURA.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKUYAMA.

5 KEI N O S H I N N A K A M U R A, called as a
6 witness on behalf of the defense, being first
7 duly sworn, testified through Japanese inter-
8 preters as follows:

9 DIRECT EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. OKUYAMA:

11 Q State your name, please, Witness.

12 A NAKAMURA, Keinoshin.

13 Q What is your age?

14 A 53.

15 Q Where do you live?

16 A 698 of 3-chome, Tamagawa, Den-en Chofu,
17 Setagaya Ward, Tokyo.

18 Q What is your present occupation?

19 A No occupation.

20 Q Please state the schools you attended,
21 the educational career.

22 A I entered the First Higher School in Tokyo
23 in 1916 and graduated in law from the Law College
24 of the Tokyo Imperial University in 1922.

25 Q Please tell the Court your professional

NAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 career or occupational career after your graduation?

2 A After graduation from the University, I
3 immediately entered the service of the Ministry of
4 Home Affairs and my first post of duty was with the
5 Fukuoka Prefectural Office. Since my entry there
6 at that -- in that prefectural office I served in
7 various government offices for a period of twenty-
8 four years, my final post being that of Vice-Minister
9 of Welfare from which I retired in 1945.

10 Q What were your principal work -- the
11 principal work that you done during the time that
12 you were in the governmental service?

13 A Thirteen of my twenty-four years of govern-
14 ment service was concerned with police administration.

15 THE MONITOR: Approximately thirteen.

16 Q What did you do -- state concretely what
17 you have done as a police officer?

18 A Approximately half of the thirteen years
19 that I was associated with the police administrative
20 affairs I was concerned with the special police. The
21 balance of those years, that is, the other half of
22 those years that I was concerned with police affairs
23 was devoted to other than affairs relating to the
24 special police. Hereafter -- this concerns only
25 Japanese, your Honor -- hereafter I shall use the

NAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 word "tokko" which is an abbreviated form of "special
2 higher police."

3 Q Will you explain more fully your career in
4 the police administrative affairs?

5 A I shall speak chronologically. Firstly, at
6 the Fukuoka Prefectural Office I was Chief of the
7 Peace Preservation Section and the higher police
8 section. Then next I was chief of the Police Affairs
9 Section and also the Peace Preservation Section of
10 the Prefectural Government of Kanagawa. Next I
11 was Chief of the Special Higher Police Section of
12 the Government Prefectural Office of Hyogo. And then
13 next I was Chief of the Building and Construction
14 Section of the Kyoto Prefectural Office. Next I
15 was associated with the Police Affairs Bureau of
16 the Home Ministry where I was assigned first to the
17 Peace Preservation Section, then to the Library
18 Section and then finally Chief of the Peace Preser-
19 vation Section. That totals approximately eleven and
20 a half years. In addition to that I supervised police
21 affairs as Governor of Ehime Prefecture for one year
22 and three months.

23 Q Judging from your career, may I understand
24 that you are a man who is well-versed with police
25 affairs?

NAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 A Yes, I am versed in police affairs in general.
2 Furthermore, then, if I should speak of any special
3 branch of police affairs, I should say that I am
4 versed in the work of the special higher police.

5 Q Then will you state clearly and briefly the
6 organization of the police system?

7 A Speaking of the police as a government
8 organization, there is a Minister of Home Affairs
9 at the top and secondly, the Prefectural Governor.
10 In Tokyo the person who would be on the same level
11 as the Prefectural Governor would be the Superin-
12 tendent General of the Metropolitan Police. In the
13 third level is the Chief of the police station. At
14 these offices there are various subsidiary organs.
15 As a subsidiary organ to the Minister for Home
16 Affairs there is the Police Bureau with its sections
17 and personnel. And subsidiary and assisting the
18 Prefectural Government is the Police Affairs Division
19 of the Prefectural Government and its personnel. Then
20 subsidiary and assisting the Superintendent General
21 of the Metropolitan Police Board is the Secretariat
22 of the Superintendent General and the personnel of
23 the entire board. And there are various subordinate
24 offices assisting the Chief of Police of each indi-
25 vidual station.

NAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 The police officials in these various
2 government offices handling police affairs and other
3 subsidiary organs are at the same time administrative
4 officials -- are at the same time in accordance with
5 the criminal case law officials of the Ministry of
6 Justice.

NAKAMURA

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1 Q Who issues orders to the police officials
2 in general?

3 A In speaking of the order of command we
4 should first of all make a distinction between two
5 things. The first is the administrative police system
6 under the control and supervision of the Minister of
7 Home Affairs. The other line of command falls under
8 the procurator, public procurator, attached to the
9 Minister of Justice.

10 Q Since when the system -- the chain of command
11 and the organization about which you have just testified
12 was enforced in Japan?

13 A I do not know accurately but I think the
14 system was instituted with the establishment of the
15 Ministry of Justice -- with the establishment of the
16 justice police system.

17 Q And in what year was it?

18 A I think at the time the Japanese constitu-
19 tion took effect and the division of the three powers
20 was established.

21 Q In what year was it in terms of western
22 calendar?

23 A Although I cannot calculate it according to
24 the western calendar I should think it around 1889
25 or 1890.

MAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: What is the purpose of all
2 this? To show that the function of the police as
3 disclosed by the prosecution's evidence is quite a
4 normal thing in Japan and has been for many years
5 and had no relation with the waging of war or pre-
6 paring for war?

7 MR. OKUYAMA: Thank you, your Honor, for
8 having given me an opportunity to explain this point.
9 That is exactly my purpose. My purpose was to make it
10 clear that the Japanese police system was continuous --
11 the same continuously since the Meiji Era and was not
12 changed at all even after the outbreak of the war.

13 Q Now, Mr. Witness, after that period have
14 there been any changes in the organization of the
15 police system and the chain of command?

16 A There has been no change.

17 Q Will you explain briefly the various depart-
18 ments of the police?

19 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, it
20 would seem that the detail in which this witness is
21 testifying is far beyond anything that is reasonable
22 with respect to his contention.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Well, he asked for a brief
24 and clear statement. If we are not getting a brief
25 one it is clear enough. You are not relying, Mr.

NAKAMURA

DIRECT.

1 Tavenner, on a change in the functions of the police?

2 MR. TAVENNER: No, sir.

3 THE PRESIDENT: I thought not. Well, I think
4 we have heard enough about the police.

5 Q Were special qualifications necessary to be
6 appointed as police officials?

7 A They are the same as all other administrative
8 officers in general and no special qualifications were
9 required.

10 Q Please explain how minor police officials
11 are appointed.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Now, that isn't necessary.
13 Is he going to depose solely to the composition of
14 the police force and the qualifications for the differ-
15 ent officials?

16 MR. OKUYAMA: No, sir. The sole object of my
17 question was to show that police officials and those
18 who are engaged in special police affairs, duties,
19 are exactly the same as other officials in other
20 departments, governmental departments, and also to
21 make clear the fact that there was nothing secretive
22 or special about the Japanese police, especially the
23 special higher police.

24 THE PRESIDENT: For the time being I don't
25 think it is necessary to convince the Court of that.

NAKAMURA

DIRECT

1 It may be in the course of the trial it will be
2 necessary and then this witness may be called again,
3 but I do think you can stand him down until he is
4 really needed.

5 MR. OKUYAMA: I understand, your Honor.
6 I shall ask him something else.

7 Q Was militaristic training ever given to the
8 police officials -- police officers?

9 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, that
10 is certainly irrelevant. There has been no claim
11 that such an act occurred.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Nothing in the prosecution's
13 case turns on that, if I understand it. You are
14 fighting shadows. That is what it amounts to.

15 MR. OKUYAMA: I understand, your Honor.

16 Q You have been testifying about the special
17 higher police. What were the duties of the special
18 higher police?

19 THE PRESIDENT: We don't want to know what
20 they are yet, and it is unlikely we will ever want to
21 know. I renew my suggestion you ask this witness to
22 stand down until you really require him.

23 MR. OKUYAMA: Mr. President, it was only a
24 prelude, all the questions I have been putting to this
25 witness -- preliminary, the questions I have been

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1 putting to this witness, and I was going to ask him
2 about the role of the special higher police, about
3 the control of the leftist and rightist elements
4 because it was the main duty of the special higher
5 police and I shall reframe my question, your Honor.
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1 BY MR. OKUYAMA (Continued):

2 Q Now, in the Japanese police, who were re-
3 sponsible for controlling leftist and rightist move-
4 ments?

5 A That was the special higher police.

6 Q When was the system of special higher
7 police' instituted?

8 A It was first instituted when a special higher
9 police section was created in the Metropolitan Police
10 Board, Tokyo, in 1910.

11 Q Under what circumstances was it created?

12 A That was because in the previous year, name-
13 ly, in 1919 -- 1909, there was a case of grand trea-
14 son when an assassin attempted to hurl a bomb against
15 the procession of Emperor Meiji. The bomb was hurled
16 by an anarchist.

17 THE PRESIDENT: This is mere gossip. We do
18 not want to hear it.

19 Q When was the special higher police made
20 throughout Japan?

21 A 1928.

22 Q Under what circumstances was it made?

23 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, it
24 would seem that these details are equally as irrele-
25 vant as the others.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: What bearing has the atti-
2 tude of the police to the leftists or to the rightists
3 on any question at issue here?

4 MR. OKUYAMA: In my understanding, it is
5 said in the Indictment that the police, together
6 with the military police, helped in preparing and
7 planning and starting and initiating the aggressive
8 war -- and waging aggressive war. Therefore, I want
9 to establish if there is any relations between the
10 police and the allegation in said Indictment.

11 THE MONITOR: It is my understanding that
12 the Indictment charges that the civilian police, to-
13 gether with the military police, played a role in
14 helping in the preparing, planning, initiating and
15 waging of an aggressive war, and my purpose here is
16 to show that the special higher police had no such
17 role.

18 THE PRESIDENT: I do not recollect anything
19 to that effect in the counts or in the particulars,
20 and there is nothing in the evidence.

21 MR. OKUYAMA: No, your Honor, there are.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, there may be. I have
23 overlooked it if there is.

24 MR. TAVENNER: Your Honor, I may save time
25 by pointing out one sentence in the Indictment:

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1 "The civil and especially the military police
2 were also used to suppress opposition to the war
3 policy."

4 THE PRESIDENT: That is one of your particu-
5 lars?

6 MR. TAVENNER: Yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Have you given any evidence
8 of it? I do not recollect any evidence of it except
9 in a general way.

10 MR. TAVENNER: The type of evidence relat-
11 ing to that subject involved the handling of the
12 censorship laws and matters of that kind. It was
13 that type of evidence.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Well, there is no need to
15 meet that allegation in this way.

16 MR. TAVENNER: We think the way in which he
17 has approached the matter is entirely aside from the
18 point that we have cited from the Indictment.

19 MR. OKUYAMA: In the course of the explana-
20 tion given by one of the prosecutors on the 13th of
21 June last year, there was mention of a Japanese
22 prosecution -- correction please.

23 THE MONITOR: In the course of an explanation
24 of the Constitution, a prosecutor, on June 13 last
25 year, spoke of the Japanese police.

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1 MR. OKUYAMA (Continuing) And in that
2 statement the prosecutor pointed out the various
3 activities and duties of the police. And it is my
4 interpretation that that statement refers to the
5 fact that the Japanese police cooperated in the
6 war policy.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are entitled to
8 call evidence to deny what the prosecution's evidence
9 revealed. But you are not doing that now; you are
10 going into the composition of the police force
11 which is no answer.

12 MR. OKUYAMA: I further state, to have your
13 Honor's preliminary understanding, that prosecution's
14 witness, KOIZUMI, Goro, has also had reference to
15 this subject during his testimony on June 24 last
16 year. In his testimony he stated in part as follows:
17 "On the basis of an overall national foundation, a
18 special higher police system was created." And with
19 respect to the duties of the higher police, he fur-
20 ther stated that, "Generally, the duties of the
21 special higher police was to control the extreme
22 left and the extreme right and especially to take sur-
23 veillance over those elements who were in opposition
24 to the government's policy between 1931 and December
25 7, 1941.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: You may invite this witness
2 to deny that if he can; but, so far you have asked
3 him to confirm it, with regard to the leftists and
4 the rightists at all events.

5 MR. OKUYAMA: Whether I could do it or not
6 I do not know, but I should like to be permitted to
7 continue my questioning of this witness.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Continue. We will stop
9 you when we think we should.

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1 BY MR. OKUYAMA (Continued):

2 Q Did the special higher police treat equally
3 both leftist and rightist movements and did it con-
4 trol -- in controlling the leftist and rightist
5 movements?

6 A Whether the movements were of leftist
7 origin or of rightist origin they were treated and
8 controlled in the same manner, if such movements as
9 carried on by these elements were destructive of
10 law and order.

11 Q Did they or did they not arrest only those
12 who run counter to the government's policies?

13 A The question whether or not control was
14 necessary was decided on the standard or on the basis
15 of whether or not it was necessary for the maintenance
16 of law and order, and government policy or whatever
17 it is, was not taken into consideration -- was not
18 considered as a basis for such action.

19 Q Then can you give us -- will you please
20 give some concrete examples to prove -- to indorse
21 what you have just stated?

22 A There are many instances in which anti-
23 government policy movements were tolerated. However,
24 in the case of the Communist movements they were
25 not only anti-government, but because one of the

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1 principle aims of the Communist party was to destroy
2 the emperor system, movements by these elements were
3 rigidly controlled as being in violation of the
4 Peace Preservation Law.

5 Q Can you state specifically some cases or
6 incidents which became the objects of the control
7 by the police?

8 A Yes, I can cite examples when I was per-
9 sonally associated with the special higher police --
10 the principal incidents during my tenure of office.

11 Q Please testify about those principal
12 incidents.

13 A First, with respect -- with regard to the
14 Communist movements, I call to mind the March 15,
15 or 3, 15 incident, and also the April 16, or 4, 16
16 incident, or the Atami incident. These were all
17 incidents in which the secret society, the Japanese
18 Communist party members were apprehended and arrested.

19 Some of the principal incidents with respect
20 of extreme nationalistic movements, I should cite
21 the Ketsumeidan incident, or the blood-brotherhood
22 incident, the 5, 15 or the May 15 incident, the
23 Shinpeitai or the God-sent troops incident, the 7, 5
24 or July 5 incident. And of course there are a number
25 of other incidents which took place while I was

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1 associated with the special higher police, all of
2 these incidents being disturbing of the higher
3 tranquility, and all of these incidents totalled
4 more than ten -- somewhere around fifteen or sixteen.
5 There were, all told, approximately forty or more
6 such disturbing incidents since 1932.

7 Q Were those rightist movements opposed to
8 the government's policies?

9 A Inasmuch as the object of these rightist
10 movements was internal or domestic renovation or
11 reform, and because the methods they employed in-
12 volved the assassination of high officials of the
13 government and leaders of the financial groups, the
14 movements and actions taken by these elements were
15 not condoned by the government as being disturbing
16 of public peace and order.

17 THE PRESIDENT: I didn't know the contrary
18 was ever contended. It has never been suggested,
19 so far as I recollect, that the conspiracies
20 alleged embraced the whole of any government or even
21 the majority of any particular government. Unless
22 we keep this evidence down to the real issues it will
23 spread over years.

24 MR. OKUYANA: I would now like to call the
25 attention of the Tribunal, Mr. President, to the

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1 opening statement or part of the opening statement
2 given by Mr. Hammack.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Inasmuch as we do not
4 have the English text on hand I shall just give the
5 summary of the passage just read by the defense
6 counsel.

7 In 1931 the March and October incidents took
8 place. These incidents involved the accused
9 FASHIMOTO, Kingoro and KOISO, Kuniaki, who were
10 extreme ultra-nationalistic leaders, and they, in
11 cooperation with the accused OKAWA, tried to carry
12 out an internal revolution, all of which was aimed
13 at Japanese nationalist expansion and the waging
14 of aggressive war.

15 THE PRESIDENT: It was never suggested
16 that the governments of those days were involved,
17 as to the whole of the governments. That suggestion
18 comes much later in the prosecution's case.

19 MR. OKUYAMA: What the witness has already
20 said would relate to the subject matter that I am
21 now about to broach upon. Am I permitted to con-
22 tinue, sir?

23 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
24 minutes.

25 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was

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1 taken until 1500, after which the pro-
2 ceedings were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 MR. OKUYAMA: Before the recess I read a
4 paragraph from the opening statement of Mr. Hammack.
5 May I be permitted to read another?

6 Continuing the reading from Mr. Hammack's
7 opening statement, it says that for the same object,
8 in February 1932, there was the assassination of
9 Finance Minister INOUE; in the same year the assassina-
10 tion of Baron DAN; in May 1932, the assassination of
11 Premier INUKAI; in 1936 the assassination of the Lord
12 Keeper of the Privy Seal, SAITO, and others, failing
13 in the attempted assassination of Premier OKADA, and
14 these incidents were employed by the prosecution by
15 saying that these incidents were utilized by the
16 accused in preparing for an aggressive war.

17 The purpose of my previous question was to
18 make it clear by way of rebuttal that these incidents
19 were rigidly brought under the control of the police --
20 the police endeavored to bring these incidents under
21 control.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we know they did because
23 there were prosecutions. But the prosecution are not
24 contending that every Japanese cabinet was in this
25 conspiracy. They have certainly made the allegation

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1 against men who were cabinet ministers.

2 MR. OKUYAMA: Therefore, I think the problem
3 is in what manner the Japanese police handled these
4 affairs.

5 THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it has arisen.
6 The suggestion is that those particular things were
7 the work of individuals and not of the government
8 as a whole.

9 MR. OKUYAMA: Of course, the government as
10 a whole did not have any part to play in these inci-
11 dents. But it is charged by the prosecution that
12 some of the accused utilized these incidents in order
13 to bring about the creation and organization of a
14 war structure for the purpose of waging aggressive
15 war, and I am trying to establish through this wit-
16 ness that this was not so.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you haven't done so
18 up to the present, nor have you attempted to. But
19 you may in your future questions. We will hear what
20 you have to ask the witness.

21 Q Now, you testified, Mr. Witness, that since
22 the year 1932 some forty disturbing incidents occurred.
23 Now, will you sum up those incidents and state the
24 nature in general of those incidents without going
25 into the details -- without stating them one by one?

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1 THE PRESIDENT: It won't help us as far as
2 I can judge. I think it is a waste of time. These
3 things are not in issue, not contested. They certainly
4 happened, and there were prosecutions.

5 MR. OKUYAMA: Now, I should like to call the
6 attention of the Tribunal again to a passage in
7 Prosecutor Hammack's opening statement. According to
8 Mr. Hammack's opening statement, if I may refer to
9 it again, it is charged that the accused plotted by
10 such means in order to have the government instruct
11 the police to suppress ultra-nationalistic and mili-
12 taristic movements and actions, as well as -- rather
13 the police were instructed --

14 According to Mr. Hammack's opening statement
15 it was charged that the accused, in order to promote
16 the plot or conspiracy of the accused, they maneuvered
17 in such a way as to have the government instruct the
18 police to suppress any announcement of words or
19 actions which would appear to be contrary to the
20 preparation for an aggressive war. And it is my
21 intention now, through this witness, to refute this
22 charge. May I be permitted to do so?

23 THE PRESIDENT: If he opened with that, and
24 I don't know whether he ever did, I don't think he
25 proved it.

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1 MR. OKUYAMA: Then I will ask some other
2 question.

3 Q Did the special higher police suppress all
4 movements against the war?

5 A Not necessarily.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Two of my colleagues think
7 this: It is not the statement that is to be rebutted,
8 but the evidence that has been presented.

9 If you can derive any help from that you
10 are at liberto to do so. It may assist you to frame
11 your questions.

12 Well, I don't recollect any evidence of this
13 type being presented myself, but it may have been.

14 Do you recollect any, Mr. Tavenner?

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1 MR. TAVENNER: I do not recollect any
2 evidence of the exact character that he is speaking
3 of.

4 MR. OKUYAMA: That makes my question unnecessary.
5 Therefore, I shall omit it.

6 THE PRESIDENT: The defense have a much
7 readier recollection of this particular phase than we
8 have, who covered the lot. You have studied this
9 particular phase. If there is any evidence you are
10 trying to meet, will you indicate it for our benefit?
11 Two of my colleagues seem to think there is, and of
12 course I must pay the greatest respect to what they
13 think.

14 Q I have a few more points to ask. Is it right
15 to call the special higher police by the name of
16 "secret police"?

17 A I think it is improper.

18 Q Why can you say it is improper?

19 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, I can't
20 see that there could be any materiality about questions
21 of that type, and I object to it.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld. Apparently
23 you don't want to argue the question.

24 Q Please state the relations which existed
25 between the special higher police and the military

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1 police.

2 A The special higher police and the Kempei or
3 military police are entirely separate entities. Of
4 course, though in some fields their activities inter-
5 mingle, actually speaking, they do not -- these two
6 entities are completely separate.

7 Q Please state the relations between the neigh-
8 borhood associations and the special higher police.

9 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, it seems
10 that this goes back to the early phases of this
11 witness' testimony in which he sought to go into great
12 detail as to the manner of formation and administration
13 of the police department. Detailed information of this
14 character can be of no value in determining any issue
15 in the case. We object to the type of testimony.

16 MR. OKUYAMA: However, the prosecutor alleged
17 that the government or the police used these neigh-
18 borhood associations to have government policies per-
19 meate into -- The prosecution has charged that the
20 police have used the Tonarigumi, or the neighborhood
21 association, to permeate government policy among the
22 masses of the people.

23 THE PRESIDENT: I don't recollect any evidence
24 to that effect, but on the assumption that there was
25 such evidence -- and my colleagues seem to think that

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1 there may be -- I allow you to ask the question.

2 Q Please explain.

3 A I was Governor of Ehime Prefecture in 1939-1940.

4 At that time, I, as governor of the prefecture, had
5 something to do with the guidance of the neighborhood
6 associations. At that time, a notification from the
7 home office came with regard to the policy of guidance
8 of these neighborhood associations, and the notification
9 said that the neighborhood association was for the
10 purpose of handling the common affairs of the inhabi-
11 tants, and among such items there was one item relating
12 to vigilance. Although the scope of this word "vigilance"
13 seems to be wide, the work or activities of the special
14 higher police was not included whatsoever. And in
15 handling the work of guidance of these neighborhood
16 associations, we have never at any time tried to nor
17 attempted to utilize the neighborhood association for
18 the purpose of carrying on the work of the special
19 higher police.

20 MR. OKUYAMA: This concludes my examination,
21 your Honor.

22 This concludes the examination in chief, your
23 Honor.

24 MR. TAVENNER: The prosecution does not desire
25 to cross-examine.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is released on
2 the usual terms.

3 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

4 MR. McMANUS: At this time I ask the Tribunal's
5 permission to call the witness IWAMATSU.

6 - - - -

7 G O R O I W A M A T S U, called as a witness on
8 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,
9 testified through Japanese interpreters as
10 follows:

11 DIRECT EXAMINATION

12 BY MR. McMANUS:

13 Q Mr. IWAMATSU, would you please state your
14 full name and your address?

15 A My name, IWAMATSU, Goro.

16 Q I now show you defense document No. 650, and
17 ask you whether or not that is your affidavit.

18 A This is mine.

19 MR. McMANUS: At this time, if the Court
20 pleases, I should like to present into evidence defense
21 document No. 650.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 650
24 will receive exhibit No. 2378.

25 (Whereupon, the document above

IWAMATSU

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24 will receive exhibit No. 2378.

25 (Whereupon, the document above

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referred to was marked defense exhibit
No. 2378 and received in evidence.)

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1 MR. McMANUS: With the Tribunal's permis-
2 sion I do not decide to read the entire document
3 although I present the entire document and the
4 witness for cross-examination purposes. I prefer,
5 with the Tribunal's permission, to ask the Tribunal
6 to recall this witness at a later stage for the
7 individual defense and I leave the statements con-
8 cerning the accused ARAKI particularly out of this
9 affidavit being read into the record.

10 May I proceed to read, your Honor?

11 (Reading): "I, Goro IWAMATSU, being duly
12 sworn, depose and say:

13 "That I presently reside in Tokyo; and that
14 I also received my education in Tokyo, to-wit, three
15 years at the Higher School and from 1918 to 1921 I
16 attended the Tokyo Imperial University in the Liter-
17 ature Department, and from 1921 to 1924 I attended
18 the Law Department of the aforementioned Tokyo
19 Imperial University.

20 "That from 1919 to 1924 I taught history at
21 the Middle School; that from 1926 to 1930 I taught
22 history and international law at the Naval Academy;
23 that from 1934 to 1937 I taught history at the Tokyo
24 Higher Agricultural College, and educational adminis-
25 tration at the Agricultural Educational Special College.

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1 "I have worked with the Minister of
2 Education from 1925 to 1945. When Marquis KIDO
3 was the Education Minister I was the Chief of the
4 Documentary Section, and when Baron ARAKI was Education
5 Minister I served under him as Chief Secretary, as
6 well as confidential secretary to the Minister.

7 "From the Fifth Year of Meiji it became
8 compulsory for all the male youths of Japan to
9 serve several years in the military service of their
10 country. The inception of military training in
11 schools dates back to the time of MORI, Education
12 Minister, in December 1895. He placed the essential
13 points of education in three virtues: dignity,
14 public confidence, and obedience, and in order to
15 nourish these virtues he adopted the system of
16 military billeting for dormitory and also military
17 drill. After that, in accordance with changes in
18 the military system such as curtailment of terms of
19 service and changes brought about as a result of
20 disarmament policies, etc., means were taken by the
21 Minister to cope with those situations. Assignment
22 of officers in active military service to different
23 schools, establishment of young men's training camps
24 and also establishment of Youth's Schools at a later
25 date were the result of, and the execution of the

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1 principle set forth by Minister MORI which, as
2 heretofore mentioned, were definitely not for the
3 purpose of militarizing the country.

4 "The system in effect in 1938 was as
5 follows: When a young man became of age he was
6 obliged to render several years of military service
7 to his country. However, if he became of age while
8 attending school, he was permitted a period of
9 grace to complete his education. At that time
10 military drill and lectures were included in the
11 curriculum of studies, however, it was not necessary
12 for students to include this training in their univer-
13 sity schedule if they did not care to do so. If
14 they did not, however, they could not become candidates
15 for an officer's commission when they entered the
16 service of their country after graduation. Hence,
17 the military training could be classified as an extra
18 subject in the list of studies in the schools to be
19 taken or not to be taken by the student, depending
20 upon whether or not he desired to become an officer
21 at some future time when he would enter his period of
22 military service.

23 "It was after August 1941 that the military
24 education in the schools was readjusted and enforced
25 more strongly than ever and it was due to the strong

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1 request of the military authorities to cope with
2 the change of the international situation. It was
3 at that time that the military education in the
4 University Division of the Universities was made
5 compulsory; before that it was just as explained by
6 President HIRAGA, that it was left to the discretion
7 of the students.

8 "During all the years of my service with
9 the Minister of Education, up until 1941 I never
10 felt that military education was a compulsory task
11 or strongly enforced.

12 "In 1942 I was appointed director of the
13 Nagasaki Higher Commercial College and I noticed
14 that the military education carried out by the military
15 officers was quite different from that which I exper-
16 ienced in my aforementioned years but there was never
17 such an incident as would hamper the graduation of a
18 student on account of his negligence or failure to
19 take the military education, nor was there any
20 interference on the part of the officers with the
21 administrative matters of the college.

22 "When the KONOYE cabinet was reshuffled in
23 1938 there was a rumor that a military man would
24 become the Minister of Education and this rumor caused
25 no little comment among the staff of the Ministry.

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1 The members of the staff were of the opinion that
2 more military personnel would be appointed function-
3 aries of the Ministry and the Ministry would become
4 militarized if such a selection were made.

5 "In the meantime it was made public that
6 General ARAKI would be appointed the Education
7 Minister. However, as time went on, not only I
8 but many others, and particularly those who came in
9 contact with Minister ARAKI learned that their fears
10 were not well founded. General ARAKI made his
11 position clear upon his very first visit to the
12 Educational Office, about which I should like to
13 cite the following experience:

14 "When he arrived at the office I asked him
15 why he did not wear a military uniform. He very
16 frankly told me that he was no more a military man
17 in the military service, but was a civilian appointed
18 to serve in a civil administrative capacity.

19 "Minister ARAKI applied himself rather dil-
20 igently to the tasks of his office, as a result of
21 which he spent many nights at his official residence.
22 He further renovated my official residence so that I
23 could stay there also. Consequently, this afforded
24 me ample opportunity to be with him frequently. In
25 fact, I was with him for the greater part of my time,

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1 either on official occasions or unofficially.

2 "When Minister ARAKI first went to the
3 Imperial University I heard the President of the
4 University, Mr. HIRAGA, tell the Minister that the
5 students had started to attend the military drill
6 which was scheduled according to the existing
7 regulation, quite voluntarily and without being
8 requested to do so. When I heard this I thought,
9 and I still think, it was due to the influence
10 caused by the current situation, for I know that
11 during the year and several months Minister ARAKI
12 served as Education Minister, he never took any
13 new measures concerning military education. He
14 never issued even a single instruction with regard
15 to this matter, nor did he enforce in any way its
16 execution. It was the same with his predecessor,
17 Marquis KIDO. It was after these two Ministers just
18 mentioned that the military education system was
19 organized in a complete form. Both Minister KIDO
20 and Minister ARAKI never ordered the educational
21 instructors to carry out military drills or lectures."

22 I now turn, if your Honor pleases, to page
23 7, last paragraph:

24 "Since the inception of military training in
25 the schools in 1882 I shall briefly outline a list of

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1 all the important ordinances and regulations and
2 changes concerning military training from that date
3 until 1944. The list of these ordinances and regulations
4 are as follow:

5 "1882 - By Education Ministry Order: Song
6 and Gymnastics made regular curriculum at the Primary
7 School.

8 "1856 (April) - Military Drill made an item
9 of curriculum at Normal and Middle School.

10 "1925 (April 11) - Order for assignment of
11 army officers in active service to schools. (Premier
12 KATO, Takaaki, UGAKI, War Minister, OKADA, Education
13 Minister)."

14 THE PRESIDENT: "1856" is not correct surely.

15 MR. McMANUS: I believe, if your Honor please,
16 it should be "1896"; however, if your Honor pleases, I
17 shall check on it and inform the Court later.

18 (Reading): "1926 (April 20) - Imperial
19 Ordinance: Order for establishment of Young Men's
20 Training Camp.

21 "1926 (April 20) - Education Ministry Order:
22 Regulations relative to the application of the above.

23 "1935 (April 1) - Imperial Ordinance: Order
24 for establishment of Youths' School.

25 "1935 (April 1) - Education Ministry Order:

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1 Regulations relative to the application of above.

2 "1935 (August) - Imperial Ordinance: Order
3 for Inspection of Military Drill at the Youths'
4 School.

5 "1941 (Sept. 5) - War Ministry Order,
6 Education Ministry Order: Regulations relative to
7 the application of order for assignment of Army
8 Officers in active service to schools. (1) Military
9 Drill in University Division of University made com-
10 pulsory, (2) Readjustment of items of training of
11 military drill.

12 "1941 (Nov. 27) - Education Ministry
13 Instruction: Items of training of military drill at
14 schools where army officers in active service are
15 assigned.

16 "1926 (Sept. 27) - War Ministry Order:
17 Regulations for inspection of military drill at
18 schools where army officers in active service were
19 assigned. (This was modified in 1927, 1934, 1937 and
20 1942).

21 "1943 (June 25) - Decision at Cabinet Meeting:
22 Essential point for establishing system of Student War
23 Time Mobilization.

24 "1943 (Sept.) - Modification of items of
25 training of military drill at schools.

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1 "1944 (Feb. 8) - Education Vice-Minister's
2 Notification: Essential point of enforcing military
3 education of students to keep pace with the wartime
4 emergency measures relative to education.

5 "This list is offered for the purpose of
6 substantiating my statement that while Minister ARAKI
7 was Education Minister during parts of the years 1938
8 and 1939 not one important ordinance or regulation was
9 effectuated by him."

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Another conclusion.

2 MR. McMANUS: This concludes the reading,
3 if your Honor pleases. However, I ask the permission
4 of the Court to put one or two direct questions to
5 the witness.

6 THE PRESIDENT: You have permission.

7 Q Mr. IWAMATSU, could you tell me the
8 average hours a week given to military training
9 or physical education concerning the whole curricu-
10 lum of study?

11 A Before I reply to this question, Mr. Counsel,
12 may I ask for permission to make some few corrections
13 in the affidavit which was just read?

14 Q Yes, please do so.

15 A In the fourth paragraph of my affidavit
16 with respect to my career, the date is given as
17 1925 to 1945. I should like to have the latter
18 date corrected to "'42."

19 THE INTERPRETER: It appears that the text
20 now in the possession of the witness is quite
21 different from the printed text, and we cannot find
22 the page. He is referring to page 4 of the English
23 text of the affidavit, about eight or nine lines from
24 the bottom.

25 A (Continuing) "for I know that during the

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1 year and several months Minister ARAKI served as
2 Education Minister, he never took any new measures"
3 at his own initiative "concerning military education."
4 I should like to insert the words "at his own initia-
5 tive."

6 Then I refer to page 7. last line of the
7 English affidavit, the date "1882" should read "1881."

8 THE PRESIDENT: Well, is the number "1856"
9 at the top of page 8 correct?

10 A This should be "1886."

11 Then, there is in this chart reference to
12 regulations relative to the Order for the establishment
13 of Youths' School -- Imperial Ordinance dated April 1,
14 1945. I should like to add after that, "Revised
15 April, 1939," in parentheses.

16 Then, "1935 (August) - Imperial Ordinance,
17 Order for Inspection of Military Drill at the Youths'
18 School," et cetera. I should like to add the word,
19 "etc."

20 And then, also, in parentheses, I should
21 like to have included, "Revised 1938."

22 The next item, "1941 (September 5)," I should
23 like to have "War Ministry Order" and "Education Ministry
24 Order" connected.

25 That is all, thank you.

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1 Q Now, will you please tell us how many hours
2 of the curriculum of study were devoted to military
3 training per week in schools?

4 A I cannot reply to that question in one
5 breath, so to speak; but from 1896 to 1925 the hours
6 devoted to the subject in the middle schools was
7 twenty-eight hours. Correction. From 1886 to
8 1925 the total number of hours devoted to the school
9 curriculum in the middle schools was twenty-eight
10 hours. Of the twenty-eight hours three hours was
11 devoted to military training.

12 Q Now, just a moment, please. Were the entire
13 three hours devoted solely to military training?

14 A No. This also included ordinary gymnastics.

15 Q Could you tell us, please, the number of
16 hours in the curriculum in the higher schools and
17 the number of hours applying to gymnastics and
18 military drill?

19 A The regular curriculum of the higher
20 industrial schools, speaking of the vocational
21 schools, was thirty-eight hours. The number of hours
22 devoted out of the thirty-eight hours to ordinary
23 gymnastics and military gymnastics was two hours.
24 In the higher schools, out of a total thirty-hour
25 regular curriculum three hours were devoted to

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1 gymnastics and military drill.

2 Q Were you in the Education Ministry at the
3 origin of the Youths' Schools?

4 A Yes, I was.

5 Q Can you tell this Tribunal, if you know,
6 why such schools were established?

7 A Yes, I can.

8 MR. COMYNS CARR: In my submission this
9 witness is not the person to tell us why, if anybody
10 could. This witness only joined the Education
11 Ministry in that year, and the only person who could
12 tell us why would be the Education Minister himself,
13 in my submission.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We receive hearsay here,
15 and he may have heard it from somebody else. Its
16 probative value will depend upon the source from
17 which it comes.

18 The objection is overruled.

19 Q Would you please tell us, Mr. Witness, why
20 the Youths' Schools were established, if you know?

21 A After graduating from the University I
22 entered the Ministry of Education with the assistance
23 and recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of
24 Ordinary Education, Mr. SEKIYA, Ryukichi, and this
25 man, Mr. SEKIYA, was the person who made efforts

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1 for the institution of the system of assigning
2 active army officers as instructors in the schools
3 as well as the establishment of the Youths' Schools,
4 and I entered the service of the Ministry of Education
5 especially for the purpose of organizing the regula-
6 tions for the Youth Training Institute and for the
7 purpose of compiling textbooks for these institu-
8 tions.

9 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until
10 half-past nine tomorrow morning.

11 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
12 was taken until Tuesday, 18 March 1947, at
13 0930.)
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